Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
English: Faculty Publications and Other Works

Faculty Publications and Other Works by
Department

8-6-2018

Storm Clouds on the Horizon: Feminist Ontologies and the
Problem of Gender
Pamela L. Caughie
Loyola University Chicago, pcaughi@luc.edu

Emily Datskou
Loyola University Chicago

Rebecca Parker
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/english_facpubs
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons, and the Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality
Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Caughie, Pamela L.; Datskou, Emily; and Parker, Rebecca. Storm Clouds on the Horizon: Feminist
Ontologies and the Problem of Gender. Feminist Modernist Studies, 1, 3: 230-242, 2018. Retrieved from
Loyola eCommons, English: Faculty Publications and Other Works, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
24692921.2018.1505819

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications and Other Works by Department
at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in English: Faculty Publications and Other Works by an
authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
© Informa UK Limited 2018

Storm Clouds on the Horizon: Feminist Ontologies and the Problem of Gender
Pamela L. Caughie, Emily Datskou, and Rebecca Parker

Abstract
Feminist digital humanities is no longer focused primarily on recovering and preserving
works by women authors. Feminist scholars are currently engaged in changing information
design and data visualizations. However, as feminists seek to create new ontologies of gender,
they face difficulties posed not only by current encoding standards, but by changing concepts of
gender. Can ontologies ever capture the complex, multi-layered, dynamic nature of gender
identities? This question is especially challenging when dealing with modernist works that
represent gender and sexual identities at the very moment of their emergence as such. Our work
on a digital edition and archive of Man into Woman (1933), the life narrative of Lili Elbe, one of
the first persons to undergo gender affirmation surgery, has brought home to us both the pressing
need for feminist interventions in data models and gender ontologies, and the difficulties if not
impossibility of any adequate ontology of gender. In answer to the question posed above, we
respond, only if we revise our concept of what the end result is: the linked data network
visualization must capture a temporal process and not a snapshot of a static moment or even
series of moments.

When we think about feminism and the digital humanities, we most often gravitate to
stand-alone digital projects devoted to major women writers—such as Mina Loy: Navigating the
Avant-Garde, The Marianne Moore Digital Archive, and Woolf Online—and to works by women
made available through aggregated resources, such as Gertrude Stein’s and Edith Sitwell’s
Hogarth Press publications in the Modernist Archives Publishing Project, The Note Books of a
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Woman Alone (1935) by Evelyn Wilson in Modernist Networks, and the TEI-encoded texts by
lesser-known British women writers in The Victorian Women Writers Project.1 Feminist digital
humanities understood in terms of subject matter makes digitization mainly about the feminist
project of recovering, preserving, and making accessible the works of women authors.
Increasingly, though, feminist digital humanities scholars such as Susan Brown, Laura Mandell,
and Miriam Posner have employed feminist theoretical concepts and practices in work on
information design and data visualization, conceiving feminism as an intervention aimed at
interrogating and changing not just who gets digitized but how such digitization necessitates new
data models and interfaces. “Feminism is not (just) about women,” write Catherine D’Ignazio
and Lauren F. Klein, “but rather draws our attention to questions of epistemology—who is
included in dominant ways of producing and communicating knowledge and whose perspectives
are marginalized.”2 A feminist practice, as D’Ignazio and Klein propose, calls on us to rethink
binaries, to consider context, to situate knowledge in terms of a subject’s position, and to
legitimize embodiment and affect. Such interventions in structures and practices evolve from
feminists’ engagement with writing by women and sexual minorities. That is, the dual aspect of
feminist digital humanities—subject and design—is recursive and mutually sustaining.
Our current collaboration on a modernist-era work has brought home to us the pressing
need for feminist interventions in data models and gender ontologies. We are each contributing
to a comparative scholarly edition (print and digital) of Man into Woman (1933), the life
narrative of Lili Elbe, who, as Danish artist Einar Wegener, underwent one of the first surgical
changes in sex in 1930.3 Initially co-editors Pamela Caughie and Sabine Meyer conceived the
project primarily as an act of recovery, preservation, and dissemination of this important work in
“sexological modernism”4 and the history of transgender. The editors wanted to make this multi-
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version work, as well as archival materials providing insight into its composition and reception,
available to scholars and the general public through digitally scanned and TEI-encoded texts.
Additionally, a collation tool will enable users to see where and how the typescript and four
primary editions in three languages vary in terms of narrative elements, pronoun choices, and
paratextual materials.5 But the deeper we got into mark-up, the more evident it became that the
categories and hierarchies available to us were inadequate for our task. We not only had to deal
with the occasional difference in gender attribution across the editions, but we also had to
identify a male subject who at times presents himself as masquerading as a woman, at others as
being inhabited by one, and who eventually becomes a woman, in a life history narrated
retrospectively from the perspective of Lili Elbe. Imagining what a cloud visualization might
look like for Lili Elbe’s narrative, we joked that we needed a storm cloud to capture the unsettled
and unsettling instances of gender in this work and the way the narrative envisions something
new forming on the horizon of gender in the modernist era.
Our awareness of the inadequacies of current encoding practices crystalized for us at the
“Transformative Digital Humanities” conference held at Loyola University Chicago in March
2018 in which the three of us participated. Subtitled “Feminist Interventions in Structure,
Representation, and Practice,” the conference featured scholars and students working to create
more complex and nuanced ways to represent gender and race in digital humanities.6 Keynote
speakers Susan Brown and Laura Mandell kicked off the event by discussing their separate but
coextensive projects, both seeking to contribute to more inclusive ontologies that are
“historically sensitive” and “dynamic” enough to enable discoveries of non-normative genders
through “big data” visualization. Their ontological work, like digital humanities projects that
focus on specific writers, seeks “to expand the literary and historical canon to include groups that
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have been understudied or misrepresented by the print record” (conference description) by giving
us access to information likely to be missed by rigid, stable, and limited ontologies.7 Rather than
simply identifying specific types of genders or sexualities, expanding gender types by adding
new terms such as “genderqueer” and “transgender,” as The Orlando Project has already done, 8
Brown and Mandell propose that new ontologies of gender might be configured around
“character clusters.” For example, Mandell works with separate teams of encoders each marking
different character qualities and functions in a work: undergraduates are coding for character
traits and activities, the graduate students for character function in novels and essays (e.g.,
protagonist, narrator), and Mandell for gender normative or non-normative characteristics based
upon the undergraduates' codes and set in relation to characters or authors.
By bringing together different datasets, such an approach to gender ontologies (which are
necessary to make visible data now left out of computational analytics and its data visualizations)
can be understood as relational and intersectional. Ontologies in this sense can, ideally, provide
information about the social, cultural and historical milieu without pigeonholing characters. As
Brown and Mandell put it, ontologies are representations, not essences, tropes not types, and as
such do not escape cultural mediation; thus, they should be designed to bring such mediation to
the fore. The challenge is finding ways to leave gender variance and gender non-conforming
types ambiguous and dynamic but still findable.9 Such “ontological agility,” Brown and Mandell
admit, is at odds with current data structures and hierarchies, which raises the question, can
gender identity, which is complex and multi-layered, ever be ontologized?
This question is especially challenging when digitizing modernist works typified by
Virginia Woolf’s Orlando, Djuna Barnes Nightwood, or Radclyffe Hall’s Well of Loneliness that
represent gender and sexual identities at the very moment of their emergence as such. The
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concept of identity is popularly understood to be a post-World War II phenomenon identified
with the work of Erik Erikson and the term “identity crisis.” However, during the 1920s, identity
was already being conceptualized: for anthropologists, identity signified differences between
cultural groups; Sigmund Freud focused on individual psychosexual development; and
sexologists associated identity with a felt sense of gender embodiment. Terminologies for gender
and sexual identity in particular bourgeoned in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
as sexologists attempted to parse distinctions among types of “sexual perversion”: Urning and
sexual invert, pederast and homosexual, Eonist and transvestite, sexual intermediate and third
sex, androgyne and gyander, to name some of the more prominent neologisms.10 Not only were
there many terms for the same phenomena but any one term could encompass various
phenomena. Sexologists as well as their patients and correspondents were using terms from
different conceptual frameworks interchangeably, which led to inconsistencies in the
employment of terminology. By 1918 when he published his autobiography, Earl Lind (a.k.a.
Ralph Werther and Jennie June) could identify as an androgyne, an invert, a homosexual, a
fairie, a girl-boy, and a woman “whom Nature disguised as a man.”11
Can computational models capture such taxonomic chaos? Originally, TEI standards
offered only two choices for encoding gender: male and female. So when Hannah Gillow
Kloster, an MA student in digital humanities at Loyola University Chicago, undertook to
produce a digital edition of Virginia Woolf’s Orlando: A Biography (1928) for her MA thesis in
the early 2010s, Digital Orlando: A Novel by Virginia Woolf, she faced a conundrum.12 Although
the TEI guidelines had recently been expanded beyond the initial binary of male or female, there
was still no easy way to mark one person as two genders within the same text without removing
the purpose of marking up gender in the first place. As Hannah explains, the tag for gender as
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outlined in the P5 TEI standards was permissible only in the listPerson element in the TEI
header.13 This hierarchical hinderance means that there was no standard way to mark up a midtext gender shift, which occurs in Chapter Three of Woolf’s fantastic novel when Orlando
awakes to find he is now a she. Hannah circumvented this issue by creating two keys for
Orlando's character, OrM and OrW, to be included in the persList element in the header.
Although this allowed her to change the gender attached to Orlando's character midway through
Chapter Three, it unfortunately suggests that Orlando turns into a different person, which is not
the case in the novel.14 The two keys also suggest that gender is both a salient feature of
Orlando’s identity and an important element in the narrative. Yet while Orlando’s sex change
sparks discussions of gender socialization undertaken by Orlando’s biographer, who narrates the
novel, and by Woolf’s readers, for Orlando, the sex change is not a defining moment. He simply
wakes up a she. Nor does the change trouble other characters, including Orlando’s servants,
dogs, and suitor, the Archduchess Harriet/Archduke Harry. Jay Prosser has argued that the novel,
despite the sex change, is not about transsexuality, indeed not about the sexed body at all; it’s
about the “cultural vicissitudes of gender.”15 How can an ontology represent that?
This technical difficulty is only exacerbated by a conceptual one. One challenge for
feminist interventions in gender ontologies is that the conceptualization of identity itself is not
consistent across texts, theories, and times. The Oxford English Dictionary defines identity
ontologically as “the quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature,
properties, or in particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness;
oneness.”16 Yet identity entails far more than a list of characteristic features consistent across
time and space. How one sees oneself, who one associates with, where one lives and travels,
what one does or reads—a complex set of tags would need to be created to begin to map the

6

corpus of identity for any one character. Concepts of gender and sexual identity in particular
change over time with the currency of new terms, as noted above, such that Radclyffe Hall’s
Stephen Gordon can be called a sexual invert in the 1920s, a lesbian in the mid-twentieth
century, and a transman in the 1990s. But gender attributes change across times and cultures as
well, the very insight provided by Orlando’s centuries-long lifespan. In a mid-twentieth-century
life narrative, for example, Jan Morris (then James) reflects on her experience as a reporter
accompanying the first British team to ascend Mount Everest in 1953 and remarks that it was a
“specifically male accomplishment”; the categories that defined the men on this expedition could
not easily be applied to women “of equal intelligence in similar circumstances.”17 Yet Morris
also concedes that by 1974, when she published her memoir, such traits could no longer be
applied to men either:
Class has lost its binding function; patriotism has lost its elevating force; young men are
no longer ashamed of weaknesses; the stiff upper lip is no longer an ideal, only a music
hall sally. The barrier between the genders is flimsier now, and no expedition will ever
again go to the Himalayas so thoroughly masculine as Hunt’s.18
This insight is not specific to the 1950s. Sherwood Anderson, Djuna Barnes, T. S. Eliot, Aldous
Huxley, D. H. Lawrence, Mina Loy, Virginia Woolf—all confront and strive to represent, in
subject and form, changing notions of gender and sexuality in the early twentieth century.
Indeed, as Caughie has argued elsewhere, the fluidity of identity boundaries that we have come
to identify with postmodernity—especially a postmodern notion of identity as socially
constructed, discursive, and fluid—has as much or more to do with the historical conditions of
modernism as with the textual theories of post-structuralism.19
Notably, within modernist texts and post-structuralist theories alike, gender is conceived
in relation to temporality, as a performative practice; identity shifts from something one is to
something one does, as Judith Butler famously puts it. Gender, Butler writes, is not “a stable
7

identity or locus of agency,” one that can be captured in a snapshot, but is instead “an identity
tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of
acts.”20 This “formulation,” according to Butler, “moves the conception of gender off the ground
of a substantial model of identity to one that requires a conception of gender as a constituted
social temporality.”21 While Butler’s discussion of gender as performative has become a
foundation of gender and queer theory, the importance of temporality within her discussion is
often overlooked. This element of temporality is especially relevant to transgender, and
especially critical to our thinking about digital ontologies of gender identity. Transgender
intensifies the temporality of identity insofar as the very term “trans” connotes movement. As
Caughie comments in her article on Orlando and Man into Woman, the difficulty of pinpointing
when the term transsexual achieved sufficient coherence and stability to be marked as a distinct
identity may be equated with the difficulty of specifying precisely when the transsexual’s
transition from one sex to the other begins and ends.22 Thus, any model of gender as
performative must take into account not just the social aspects of identity (identities are produced
for and by others) but the temporal aspects as well (behaviors need to be reiterated over time to
produce a gender identity). Thus, we need what we call a “trans ontology,” a model that captures
the process of gender identity formation not a snapshot of the character formed. Derived from
our work on trans narratives, this model would not only foreground the movement implicit in
identity but also illustrate the recursive and mutually sustaining relationship between subject and
representation that we view as fundamental in feminist digital humanities.
With respect to specific modernist narratives and gender and sexual ontologies, what
does one do, for example, with Stephen Gordon in Hall’s The Well of Loneliness (1928)?
Although the narrative identifies Stephen with sexual inversion, understood as a congenital
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disorder, Stephen herself never accepts that label. She goes from asking “What am I?” to stating
“being what I am” without naming what she is.23 In fact, Stephen consistently rejects
identification with those termed “inverts.” At the time of Hall’s writing, “sexual inversion”
conflated homosexuality with what Hirschfeld named transvestism and what we call today
transgender. Thus, to her father, who reads Karl Ulrichs and Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Stephen
is an invert; to her mother Stephen is an abomination, a sin against nature; to Mary she is a
female husband; to many she is simply queer. Any gender ontology would have to be flexible
enough to capture these various designations in the context of specific relationships, and
indefinite enough to resist pinning Stephen down to any one identity.
Similarly, Djuna Barnes’s character Dr. Matthew O’Connor in Nightwood (1936) defies
gender ontologies. In an early scene excised by T. S. Eliot in the published version, the doctor
relates to Frau Mann his experience of being caught in an alley having sex with a man. While
being fondled by the hands of a stranger, he felt the "less pleasing hand, the hand of the law"
touch him on the shoulder.24 The doctor’s description of the obscenity trial makes clear that he
had been charged with a homosexual act. However, in a later chapter “Watchman, What of the
Night?”, he is presented as a cross-dresser. Nora Flood makes an unannounced visit to the
doctor’s room, finding him in bed “in a woman’s flannel nightgown” and wearing “a wig with
long pendent curls that touched his shoulders.”25 Later in the chapter transvestism morphs into
sexual inversion understood as cross-gender identification: “Misericordia,” the doctor intones,
“am I not the girl to know of what I speak?”:
In the old days I was possibly a girl in Marseilles thumping the dock with a sailor ….
[a]m I to blame if I’ve turned up this time as I shouldn’t have been, when it was a high
soprano I wanted …. [F]or, no matter what I may be doing, in my heart is the wish for
children and knitting. God, I never asked better than to boil some good man’s potatoes
and toss up a child for him every nine months by the calendar.26
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In order to capture Matthew O’Connor’s gender identity digitally, we would need more
than to add “sexual invert” to our mark-up. Relevant here is the recent conversation in the TEI
community regarding the representation of gender simplified to single-letter attributes (M for
male, F for female, O for other, N for non-applicable, U for unknown).27 Simply adding I for
invert or T for transgender would not suffice. Barnes’s novel, though heavily influenced by
sexological discourse of the 1920s, uses the term “invert” only once, and that is in relation to
Robin Vote, not Matthew O’Connor. And “transgender” is a contemporary concept of limited
use in conveying a modernist understanding of gender. A visualization of “character clusters”
would not suffice either, for Matthew identifies as a woman and a doctor, a son and a Catholic
but not sufficiently or consistently enough to have any one primary identity prevail. Moreover,
the nuances of sexuality and dress would be lost. As Miriam Posner notes, “the most common
types of data visualization … are great for quickly conveying known quantities but terrible at
conveying uncertainty or conflicting opinions,”28 such as we see in Barnes’s novel and in much
modernist writing. Thus, we need a trans ontology that is situational and relational, capable of
apprehending shifting identities in space and time.
Even if digital ontologies were able to show changes in identity over time via, for
instance, a timeline, they would still not be able to illustrate accurately how temporality works
within any one identity. The necessary separation of gender into individual data points might
erroneously suggest a progressive and forward trajectory towards a fixed point, as in the notion
of transsexualism as a transition from one gender to another. Additionally, how do we take into
account the identities or characteristics given to characters by others? For example, in a wordfrequency cloud, typically the most used words in a text show up. But it would take an extensive,
complex mark-up that has not yet been standardized to know if those words are being applied to
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the character (e.g., how society labels certain behaviors or traits) or are used by the character
(e.g., how the subject identifies). Some transwomen, for example, want to be identified simply as
women, others want to acknowledge their transness. Lili Elbe identified herself as “a real girl.”29
Are ontologies naming how others, including the encoders, label characters or how characters
identify themselves? These questions emphasize the importance, as Brown and Mandell noted in
their lecture, of distinguishing whether the visualization is of the data or of the text itself. We
have to build our ontologies from the end-goal of what we want the visualization to disclose.
With respect to gender ontologies considered from the perspective of transgender, the
question then becomes, can we present gender as a social-temporal process? Current
visualization models, for example, do not take into account the relational aspect of identity; they
tell us the occurrence rate for specific data, whether characteristics, behaviors, or words, but they
do not necessarily tell us when in the text this data occurred. For example, the conception of
Orlando’s beautiful legs—a key trait—changes with the passage through different eras. In the
first chapter set in the age of Queen Elizabeth I, that feature signifies masculinity, yet by the
fourth chapter set in the age of Queen Victoria, the same feature signifies femininity. Can data
analytics capture such a temporal shift? Or, if a visualization showed that “invert” were a
dominant word in a modernist work, as it is in The Well, does this signify that inversion is a
dominant characteristic of a character’s identity? What if most uses of “invert” occur in the
beginning of a text? Might that suggest “invert” was heavily discussed and then rejected as an
identity category, or that “invert” was used within a specific period in the text among specific
people and not with other people later in the text? What if a character displays a particular
attribute with only one other character, might that not say more about their relationship than
about the character’s identity? All of these explanations are possible and all affect how we
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conceptualize identity and gender ontologies, but not all can be captured in the static, snapshot
visualizations commonly used. Indeed, such data analytics could be misleading. Given that the
word “invert” appears over a hundred times in The Well but only once in Nightwood, a
visualization might erroneously suggest that The Well is the queerer text.
With respect to our digital project, Man into Woman poses many of the same problems
presented by Woolf’s, Barnes’s, and Hall’s novels. The first decision we had to make in
encoding this text was whether or not to tag “Andreas Sparre” (the fictional name given to Einar
Wegener in the narrative) and “Lili Elbe” as the same person, in keeping with current practices
in transgender scholarship. Our decision to forego this practice was based on the thrust of the
narrative logic, as indicated by the title (in the original Danish, Fra Mand til Kvinde, From Man
to Woman), which insists on a distinction between the two. “Andreas Sparre was dead,” the
narrative states emphatically after Lili’s third operation.30
Yet within the text that distinction is upheld inconsistently, and comes about slowly as
Lili begins to deal with her newly embodied identity. Chapter VIII opens with a continuation of
his life narrative that Andreas, who has been cross-dressing as Lili for years, recites to his friends
Niels and Inger on the eve of the first operation in Berlin: “So Lili and I continued to live our
double life, and no one, neither the ‘initiated’ nor myself, saw in this anything else than a
pleasant kind of distraction and entertainment, a kind of artists’ caprice.”31 Lili is presented here
as a performance. Yet already Lili has acquired her own set of friends, her own memories, and
her own habits “which had nothing whatever to do with me,” Andreas says.32 Are “Lili and I”
“one and the same” in this double life, or two separate people in one body, as both Andreas and
Lili insist elsewhere? At the end of the previous chapter, and before any surgical intervention,
Andreas and his wife Grete play a joke on his parents by presenting Lili to them as a Parisienne.

12

The parents know only Andreas, they have no knowledge of Lili, and they are incredulous to
learn that “Andreas and Mademoiselle Lili from Paris are one and the same person.”33 Tellingly,
it is not Andreas who reveals the truth to his parents, but Lili: “when she suddenly disclosed her
identity, they … could no longer trust their own eyes.”34 That identity, presumably, is their son,
Andreas.
Keeping the characters separate not only supports the narrative logic, as noted above, but
also enables us to indicate when the two characters are present in the same scene. For example,
after the first operation, a castration performed in Berlin, the narrative begins to refer to the
subject as Lili. Before entering the Women’s Clinic in Dresden, where the two remaining
procedures will be performed, Lili must return to Dr. Karner, who drew Andreas’s blood before
the first operation. The doctor does not recognize her as Andreas. Surprised, and somewhat
ashamed, she introduces herself as “Lili Sparre.” “Sparre … Sparre …,” the doctor ponders,
much confused, “of course the name sounds familiar. Mr. Sparre was here about a fortnight ago.
… But I cannot call you to mind, madam.”35 To which Lili replies, “The gentleman and I,
Doctor, are, in fact, one and the same person.”36 The doctor is all the more “dumbfounded,” but
then attributes the misattribution to Lili’s lack of command of the German language. “The
German language is a very difficult language,” he tells Lili. “What you said before sounded very
amusing—as if you had said that you and your husband were one and the same person.”37 Here
in a rare act of identification with Andreas, Lili’s acceptance that they are “one and the same
person” produces a comic effect, as in an earlier scene when Lili (Andreas cross-dressed for a
carnival) has to fend off the advances of one of Andreas’s classmates,38 or in the scene where a
Count asks Andreas for the hand of his sister, Lili.39
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Moreover, for our project, using the P5 TEI guidelines, gender ontologies are
complicated by differences across languages. In the modernist era, “gender” was beginning to be
used synonymously with “sex” in English-language writings whereas in German and in Danish,
the other languages of this narrative, “gender” was solely a linguistic concept, not an identitarian
one. This use of gender is consistent with past iterations of TEI guidelines still in use that
categorize gender in terms of sex attribute values (e.g., M and F) and provide a “gen” element
used specifically in relation to a linguistic representation of gendered words.40 As an example of
this grammatical complication, consider this passage from the American edition: “The next
morning news came from Professor Kreutz in Dresden. Everything was ready for the patient’s
reception. If the patient’s physical state allowed, the journey to Dresden might be undertaken
immediately.”41 In the English translation, the only pronoun used is “him,” referring to Dr.
Karner. In the Danish version, however, “hende” or “her” is used in reference to the patient: “Alt
var parat til, at Patienten kunde komme, saafremt hendes Tilstand tillod hende at gøre Rejsen til
Dresden” (“Everything was ready for the patient to come should her condition allow her to
undertake the journey to Dresden”).42 The German reads “Alles sei zur Aufnahme bereit. Falls
der körperliche Zustand des Patienten es im übrigen erlaube, könne sogleich die Reise nach
Dresden angetreten werden” (“Everything would be ready for reception. If the patient’s physical
state allowed, the journey to Dresden could be undertaken immediately”).43 Again, no pronoun is
used for the patient; "der Patient," gendered male in German, could be male or neutral. The
passive voice construction in English elides any choice of pronoun, raising the question of just
when the subject in this narrative is recognized as the “other sex.”
Just as the editor and translators had to decide which pronoun to use for the patient, in
encoding the English-language editions, we too have to decide how we capture that ambiguity in
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a multi-lingual text. Do we assign “der Patient” a sex value attribute, gendering the patient male
(in contradiction of the Danish edition), or do we not, leaving it ambiguous? In the latter case, we
lose data we cannot definitively encode; in the former, we lose a temporally-specific ambiguity.
To begin to handle this level of complexity, we need a trans ontology that can render the
oscillation between gender identities, and the way gender is determined by the person or persons
being addressed at a particular time in a particular location in a particular language. Posner
points out the challenges: “technically speaking, we frankly have not figured out how to deal
with categories like gender that are not binary or one-dimensional or stable.”44 A useful model
would have to deal with gender as time and place dependent, yet dealing with time in any way
other than fixed dates is, technically speaking, a problem. An ontology formed around "clusters"
of traits, as described above, is one model for approaching gender conceived as “shifting,
performative, historically situated, etc. rather than fixed.”45 Given that ontologies, as Brown and
Mandell remind us, are representations that exist in a particular domain of discourse, another
model suggested by our project might consist of clusters of discourses: e.g., terms from
sexological discourse, those used in popular writings of the modernist era, terms from different
cultures of the time, and terms currently in use in transgender studies. Then we might add some
kind of overlapping and color-coding of these tags to reveal not what trans is but where the
convergences and gaps are among these various terms, and how gender shifts over time and
across discourse communities. Such an ontology, which has broader implications for how to
visualize humanities data, would not just name reifications of identity categories but, as Brown
and Mandell observe, might also reveal “possibilities forcibly foreclosed.”46
But even if we could establish temporal, spatial, and relational models of marking gender,
would we be describing one particular narrative rather than creating linked open data capable of
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revealing patterns across narratives? If gender ontologies cannot accurately depict the temporal
and situational aspects of gender are they, we wonder, always subject to producing essentialist
representations of gender? In their presentation, Brown and Mandell acknowledge that “both
within philosophy and computing/information studies, there is a lot of slippage towards
positivism or essentialism in the ways that ontologies are approached and understood.”47 And
while their conception of gender derives from Butler’s performativity, their methodology for
producing a gender ontology may risk inadvertently reinforcing a substantive notion of gender as
essentialist, and essential.
Any proposed solution to the project of gender ontologies forces us to confront a
conundrum. On the one hand, gender ontologies, for all their hierarchical, Anglocentric, and
metaphysical baggage, are crucial if we are going to map the formation and de-formation of
gender across texts, times, and cultures. Ontologies could be helpful in showing where similar
terms are being used in different ways, within a text and across texts, or how one person's
gender/sexuality is being defined in different ways within a text. On the other hand, there may
not be a technological solution to the difficulties posed by gender ontologies. Data will always be
contextual, limited, and only proximate to any individual identity. Returning to our earlier
question, can identities ever be ontologized?, our answer is, only if we revise our concept of
what the end result is: the linked data network visualization must capture a temporal process and
not a snapshot of a static moment or even series of moment. Our project has made us reconsider
the process of creating an ontology that leads up to such visualizations, and part of understanding
that process is taking into account the theorization of gender informing it as well as the
temporality that is “forcibly foreclosed” in current models of gender and ontologies.
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Working on modernist texts such as Lili Elbe’s has made clear to us the necessary
messiness of any gender ontology. Confusion in gender and sexual terminologies in a text like
Elbe’s, though, is not something we should seek to clear up in terms of our present understanding
of transgender. For that confusion is part of the experience of gender and sexuality in the
modernist era, something to be realized and negotiated in readings of the narrative. Such
negotiation can happen only in a collaboration among scholars, encoders, and users to navigate,
not resolve, the temporal dynamics of identity and identification.
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